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Introduction to Pragmatism and
Theories of Emergence
Guido Baggio and Andrea Parravicini
1 Emergence is a pivotal concept for interpreting the reality of natural and social human
life in all its processual complexity. The recently renewed debate about this concept
and  the  different  forms  of  emergentism  is  particularly  varied,  widely  referring  to
biology, metaphysics, philosophy of mind (Kim 1999, 2005, 2006a,b; Cunningham 2001;
Pihlström 2002;  El-Hani  2002;  El-Hani  &  Pihlström  2002;  Chalmers  2006;  Bedau  &
Humphreys 2008; Corradini & O’Connor 2010; Okasha 2012; Humphreys 2016; Sartenaer
2016;  Lota  2017),  neuroscience  (Tononi  &  Koch  2015),  as  well  as  to  social  sciences
(Hodgson 2000; Sawyer 2001; Lawson 2013). On such a perspective, some authors, like
the proponents of the so-called Cambridge Social Ontology (Lawson 2013), support a
form of  emergentism which opposes to  any kind of  dualism that  presupposes total
independence between the domains of matter and mind, the physical and the social,
thus  avoiding,  at  the  same  time,  any  reductionist  causal  explanation  of  the  latter
through the former.
2 From a general perspective on emergence, some characteristics of the world, whether
these are objects, properties or other things, manifest themselves as the result of the
interconnection of other existing entities, usually more elementary, to which, however,
they  cannot  be  completely  reduced  (see  Humphreys  2005).  According  to  an
evolutionary perspective, emergence is the occurrence of a new system that, before its
appearance,  cannot be predicted or explained through its  antecedent conditions. In
social  sciences,  Geoffrey  Hodgson  pointed  out  that  emergence  is  a  broader  notion
which “provides a necessary means to focus on higher-level units and relations and to
avoid the potentially intractable problem of analytical reduction to lower-level units”
(Hodgson 2000: 74-5). 
3 Although  the  concept  of  emergence  is  taken  as  a  point  of  reference  in  different
disciplinary  fields,  it  is  nonetheless  acknowledged  to  be  very  complex  when
investigated through a rigorous examination (for a recognition see Clayton & Davies
2006).  Newsome  (2009:  61-2)  argued  that  “emergence”  is  “a  pivotal  concept  for
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interpreting the reality of human life in all its complexity, from scientific endeavor to
personal  morality  to  religious  understanding.  Although emergence  is  a  notoriously
difficult  phenomenon to study rigorously,  few areas of  study are likely to prove as
intellectually and practically consequential in the long run.” 
4 The main difficulties actually concern the definition of what precisely is emergence
(Kim 2006a), which is the nature of the related causal powers (Anjum & Mumford 2017)
and what is its causation role (Bedau 2008; Lota 2017; Baysan 2018). 
5 According to  Stephan (1999a),  the  term “emergence”  has  different  roles  to  play  in
different  disciplines.  As  he  noted,  “there  are  three  theories  among  the  different
varieties  of  emergentism  deserving  particular  interest:  synchronic emergentism,
diachronic emergentism, and a weak version of emergentism” (Stephan 1999a: 49).1 More
recently, Richardson and Stephan (2007) indicated nine principal features of classical
emergentism: 1) emergentism is naturalistic; 2) emergent properties are novel, though
novelty  “need  not  be  a  temporal  claim”  (Richardson  &  Stephen  2007:  92);  3)
emergentism  involves  systemic  properties  which  are  irreducible  and  novel;  4)  the
systems are hierarchically organized; 5) emergence involves synchronic determination;
6) emergent properties are irreducible and therefore;  7) not deducible;  8) emergent
properties are not predictable from first principles; and 9) emergent properties exhibit
downward causation. According to Richardson and Stephan (2007: 94), the 8) and 9) are
the  most  demanding  conditions  for  emergence.  In  particular,  the  condition  of
unpredictability has to face with the question whether the organizational properties
are themselves straightforward consequences of constituent properties; whereas the
downward causation is the most controversial of the conditions, because if the higher
levels of organisation are relevant to the behaviour of constituents, then the causal
links  provided  at  the  lower  levels  would  be  incomplete  or  would  violate  what  are
thought of  as  “principles of  physical  closure” (see Campbell  1974;  Kim 1992,  1993a,
1993b). It has to be noted that the difficulties with the physical closure mainly relate to
a theoretical frame that only supports a physicalist version of naturalism, even though
non-reductionist or “minimal” (Kim 2005: 13). However, different forms of scientific
naturalism  are  possible  which  can  help  to  face  with  the  demanding  conditions  of
emergence.2 On this point, Sami Pihlström proposed an alternative path to Stephan’s
perspective according to which all emergentisms are based on a physicalist monism. In
Pihlström’s view, it is necessary to carry out a conceptual clarification about the notion
of emergence, particularly regarding the theme of downward causation, which would
bring that notion very close to the theoretical framework of pragmatist naturalism.
According to him, the concept of “nature” that belongs to the naturalism of Peirce,
James, Dewey, and Mead, offers a richer vocabulary and a wider horizon than those of
physicalism, which dominates in contemporary metaphysical theories (Pihlström 2002:
165).
6 Now, although references to classical pragmatists and their more direct predecessors
have been and continue to be rare in literature, it is undoubtable that the contributions
that those thinkers provided to the first reflections on the notion of emergence are
highly significant and deserve to be further investigated.
7 The earliest formulations on the notion of emergence date back at least to John Stuart
Mill.3 In his System of Logic Mill distinguished between, on the one hand, heteropathic
effect  and  (chemical)  laws  and,  on  the  other  hand,  homeopathic  effects  and
(mechanical)  laws,  arguing  that  “[t]o  whatever  degree  we  might  imagine  our
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knowledge of the properties of the several ingredients of a living body to be extended
and perfected, it is certain that no mere summing up of the separate actions of those
elements will ever amount to the action of the living body itself” (Mill 1843, Bk.III, Ch.6,
§1). A few years later, Chauncey Wright, the “coryphaeus” of the Metaphysical Club in
Cambridge  (Mass.)  and  the  philosophical  mentor  of  William  James  and  Charles S.
Peirce, coped with the Darwinian difficulties about the continuity and the differences
between animal and human forms and he put at the center of his reflections the notion
of “novelty,” whose meaning was quite the same to that of “emergence.” In his long
essay “The Evolution of Self-Consciousness” (Wright 1873), the American philosopher
draw an evolutionary continuity between animal instincts and human intelligence by
showing that the latter emerged as  a  new function of  some older traits  and powers
already  present,  to  a  lesser  degree,  in  our  proto-human  ancestors  (see  Parravicini
2012). 
8 In  1896,  the  British  biologist  C. Lloyd  Morgan,  who  would  have  led  early  in  the
Twentieth century the emergentist movement, gave a lecture on “Habit and Instinct” at
the University of Chicago (Morgan 1896), the very same year in which the functionalists
James R.  Angell  and  Addison W.  Moore  undertook  a  psychological  experiment  on
attention and habit under the guidance of John Dewey and George H. Mead (Angell &
Moore 1896). Morgan’s thesis was that human evolution occurred mainly at a social-
economic emergent level, which is not explicable in merely biological terms. He further
developed his ideas in the following years and in 1923, three years after the publication
of Alexander’s Space, Time, and Deity (1979 [1920]) he integrated his emergentist view of
evolution  with  Einstein’s  special  and  general  theories  of  Relativity.  According  to
Morgan,  when basic  physical  processes  achieve  a  certain  level  of  complexity  of  an
appropriate kind, genuinely novel characteristics emerge that could not be predicted
neither from a full and complete knowledge of their lower level parts and relations.
This theory was taken up a few years later by Mead (2002 [1932]), who tried to integrate
his social psychology with the processual philosophy and the activity which structures
the  reality  that  organisms  inhabit. In  Mead’s  attempt  to  link  together  his  social-
behavioural  psychology with the theory of  relativity in order to  avoid any psycho-
physical dualism or reductionist naturalism, the notion of “emergence” refers to an
evolutionary relational process which happens in a “specious” present and that can be
explained only a posteriori. In the wake of Mead, Dewey developed a distinct variant of
emergentism based  on  the  concept  of  experience  as  “the  result,  the  sign,  and  the
reward of that interaction of organism and environment” (Dewey 1985 [1934]: 22. See
also Alexander 1992). Before them, William James’s evolutionary epistemology (James
1981 [1890]; 1977 [1909]). See Richards 1987; McGranahan 2017) can be seen as a way to
explain the emergence of novelties in nature. New ideas and behaviours emerge in our
social  and  natural  environmental  interactions  as  possible  adaptive  responses.
Furthermore, many interpreters of Charles S. Peirce noted that his metaphysics entails
a form of emergentism (Hacking 1983; Prigogine & Stengers 1984; Tiercelin 1998).
9 Summing  up,  for  the  classical  pragmatists,  emergentism  can  be  considered  as  a
compromise between physicalist  reductionism and all-out dualisms.4 All  pragmatists
assumed  a  diachronic  form  of  emergentism.  Temporality  plays  a  key  role  in  their
position and for their dynamic attitude to metaphysics in general, they were not much
interested  in  synchronic  dependence  relations,  which  contemporary  emergence
theoreticians usually talk about.5
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10 The focus of the European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy on “Pragmatism
and Theories of Emergence” addresses the lack of attention, in the current literature,
on pragmatist authors in relation to the debate on emergence and emergentism. It is in
fact  undoubtable  that  the  contributions  those  thinkers  provided  to  the  first
elaborations  of  emergentism  and  to  the  related  notion  of  emergence  are  deeply
significant  and  deserve  to  be  further  investigated.  The  issue,  therefore,  collects
contributions  that  offer  some original  ideas  and  interesting  insights  on  Pragmatist
tradition, and provides some new historical-theoretical perspectives to the issues of
emergentisms from which to look at the current debate on emergence.
11 The issue, whose order of contributions follows, at least in principle, the historical-
genealogical development of the pragmatist reflections on emergence, begins with a
study  on  the  thought  of  Chauncey  Wright,  the  coryphaeus  of  classical  pragmatist
philosophers  at  Metaphysical  Club  in  Cambridge  (Mass).  Andrea  Parravicini’s
“Pragmatism and Emergentism in Chauncey Wright’s Evolutionary Philosophy” focuses
on  Wright’s  “forward-looking”  thought  and  its  close  relationship  with  the  rising
pragmatist  philosophy.  In  the  framework  of  Wright’s  original  interpretation  of
Darwin’s evolutionary theory,  the article explores the key notions of  “novelty” and
“new uses,” through which Wright developed an “emergentist” thought well ahead of
its time. Furthermore, Parravicini analyzes Wright’s theoretical reflections about the
origin of human self-consciousness as a paradigmatic case of authentic evolutionary
novelty  and,  at  the  end  of  the  paper,  he  focuses  on  Wright’s  sketched  pragmatic
realism.
12 In  “The  Throne  of  Mnemosyne.  Pragmatism  and  Emergence  as  Aspects  of  Organic
Memory,” Kermit Snelson brings Peirce’s thought very close to that “organic memory”
theories  which  flourished,  but  were  strongly  opposed,  at  Peirce’s  times,  and  are
remembered  today  in  connection  with  discredited  theories  like  Lamarckian
inheritance.  The author  argues,  however,  that  those  theories  can be  viewed as  the
earliest attempt to build a “still-unrealized, post-nominalist re-foundation of science,”
if  we  read  them  in  the  context  of  their  own  time.  It  is  in  the  light  of  these
considerations  about  the  affinities  between  Peirce’s  philosophy  and  those  “organic
memory” theories that Snelson provides brilliant insights into the systematic unity of
the  various  aspects  of  Peirce’s  thought,  especially  regarding  the  close  relationship
between pragmatism and what is now called “emergence.” 
13 Both Jimmy Aames’s “Patternhood and Generality: A Peircean Approach to Emergence”
and Maria  Regina Brioschi,  “Does  Continuity  Allow for  Emergence? An Emergentist
Reading of Peirce’s Evolutionary Thought” provide an emergentist reading of Peirce’s
thought, although they draw their analyses from two different theoretical perspectives.
Aames argues that the radical version of emergentism, which supports the idea of the
existence of  ontological  emergence,  and the ontological  reductionism, which claims
that all instances of emergence are epistemological, are both problematic. Inspired by
the philosophical ideas of Charles S. Peirce and Daniel Dennett, the aim of the paper is
to outline an alternative form of emergence that Aames calls “real pattern emergence.”
Peirce’s pragmaticism and Scholastic realism help the author, in particular, to identify
such  a  real  pattern  with  what  Peirce  calls  a  real  general  (or  real  Third).  It  is
autonomous from the elements or processes instantiating it and supports predictions
not only about what will happen in a given situation, but also about what would happen
in  a  number  of  not-yet  actualized  situations.  According  to  Aames,  the  autonomy
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attributed to the real patterns is the crucial element which distinguishes them both
from mere epistemological emergence and from ontological emergence. 
14 In the wake of the path opened up by some recent emergentist readings of Peirce’s
thought,  Brioschi  aims  to  clarify  the  theoretical  problem  of  emergence  from  a
pragmatist perspective and to illustrate Peirce’s standpoint through special reference
to his evolutionary doctrine. After a brief introduction to the contemporary debates on
emergence and a historical overview of Classical Pragmatism and British Emergentists,
Brioschi focuses on an emergentist reading of Peirce’s theory of evolution and shows
how  Peirce’s  strong  emphasis  on  chance  and the  “growth”  of  the  universe  goes
together with synechism, through what he calls agapasm.
15 In  “Emergent  Sign-Action:  Classical  Ballet  as  a  Self-Organized  and  Temporally
Distributed Semiotic Process,” Pedro Atã and João Queiroz explore Peirce’s pragmatic
conception of sign action in the light of a distributed and emergent view of cognition.
The authors consider semiosis as a temporally distributed process in which a regular
tendency towards certain future outcomes emerges out of a history of sign actions.
Within such a process, emergence is an ubiquitous condition, and the translation of
signs  into  signs  has  to  take  into  account  a  complex  multi-level  interplay  of
potentialities  and  tendencies,  or  upward  constitutive  determinative  relations  and
downward  selective  determinative  relations.  According  to  this  view,  emergence  is
identified as  a  central  defining condition of  the  meaning processes,  as  the authors
illustrate well  through the example of  emergence of  classical  ballet,  viewed as sign
action and self-regulatory process.
16 Michela Bella’s “Novelty and Causality in William James’s Pluralistic Universe. From
Psychology  to  Metaphysics”  addresses  William  James’s  understanding  of  causal
connections  aiming  to  highlight  the  problematic  relationship  between  novelty  and
continuity,  that  is  to  say,  the  issue  of  the  emergence  of  genuinely  new events  in  a
paradigm of natural continuity. In particular, Bella focuses on the concept of causality
that James already challenged in Principles of Psychology and, then, in a more systematic
way, in Some Problems of Philosophy (1911) and A Pluralistic Universe (1909), attempting to
clarify what his naturalism consists of in the light of emergentist conceptions.
17 Stephen Pratten’s contribution on “Dewey on Organisation” compares Dewey’s remarks
on organisation with Tony Lawson’s perspective on social ontology, and Mark Bickhard
and Richard Campbell’s interactivist framework. In particular, the article focuses on
the different treatments of the organization, showing how in Dewey’s later writings
there are many remarks on organisation which anticipated some of the insights that
have been systematically set out in the naturalistic perspectives of Lawson, Bickhard
and Campbell, in which the thorough theorization of organization is considered to be
crucial  in  accounting  for  emerging  phenomena,  resisting  ontological  and  causal
reductionism and resolving the  ambiguities  associated with certain  formulations  of
downward causality.
18 The last three articles are mainly dedicated to G. H. Mead’s thought on emergence. In “
Evolution and Emergence. Comparing C. Lloyd Morgan’s Emergentism and G. H. Mead’s
Processual Ontology,” Guido Baggio detects the most significant turning points on the
parallel intellectual paths that led Morgan and Mead to develop independently their
theories of emergence. Taking as a starting point the Lowell Lectures Morgan gave in
the  winter  of  1895-1896,  as  well  as  Mead’s  1890s  writings  on  psychophysics  and
comparative psychology, Baggio points out a similarity between Mead and Morgan’s
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ideas on organic and mental evolution at that time. He argues that Morgan’s theory of
emergence and Mead’s processual ontology were conditioned by the reflections that
the two thinkers had developed over the years and traces back their roots to the early
1890s. Furthermore,  Baggio  examines  Lloyd  Morgan’s  emergentism  and  Mead’s
processual ontology, pointing out more interesting similarities and dissimilarities.
19 Lawrence Cahoone’s “Mead and the Emergence of the Joint Intentional Self” explores
Mead’s  both non-reductive  naturalistic  account  of  “emergence”  and  the  notion  of
“joint  intentionality,”  employing  mainly  the  work  of  William C.  Wimsatt,  Michael
Tomasello  and Thomas Suddendorf.  In  particular,  Cahoone compares,  on one hand,
Mead’s  idea  of  “teleological”  character  of  the  emergent  evolution  with  Wimsatt’s
notion of  emergent  levels as  hierarchical  divisions of  stuff organized by part-whole
relations. On the other hand, he puts in relation Mead’s thesis that human mind is
communicative,  i.e.,  that  thought  is  a  conversation  among  cognitive  and  affective
socially acquired and imaginatively recombined perspectives, with Tomasello’s notion
of “joint intentionality.” Cahoone then tries to extend the notion of joint intentionality
and to relate it to other features of human evolution, such as mental time travelling,
language, and culture.
20 Scott Taylor’s “G. H. Mead’s Philosophical Hermeneutics of the Present” concludes the
issue by putting George H. Mead in dialogue with Hans-Georg Gadamer. The paper aims
to demonstrate how Mead’s notion of emergence in the present of both past and future
neatly aligns with Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics and that Mead’s philosophy
of  the  present  also  amounts  to  a  theory  of  interpretation.  Taylor  traces  back  the
foundation of this claim to the pivotal influence of Wilhelm Dilthey on both Gadamer
and the young Mead. The author, while putting Mead’s texts into dialogue with some of
Gadamer’s  most  fundamental  concepts,  criticizes  Hans  Joas’s  several  missed
opportunities at providing a philosophical hermeneutic account of Mead’s work.
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NOTES
1. According to synchronic emergentism, a property of a system is emergent if it is irreducible to
the  arrangement  and  the  properties  of  the  system’s  part,  whereas  diachronic  emergentism
argues that emergent properties could not have been predicted in principle before their first
instantiation. These strong versions of emergentism are not independent of each other, “since
irreducible  properties  are  eo  ipso  unpredictable  in  principle  before  their  first  appearance”
(Stephan 1999a: 49).  Stephan also argues that at the basis of these strong versions there is a
common  ‘weak’  theory  which  presents  three  basic  features,  namely:  the  thesis  of  physical
monism,  the  thesis  of  systemic  (or  collective)  properties,  and  the  thesis  of  synchronic
determinism. See also Stephan 1999b. 
2. On different versions of naturalism see L. Rudder Baker 2017. As Laughlin (2005: 208) argues:
“science has now moved from an Age of Reductionism to an Age of Emergence.”
3. On the history of British Emergentism see McLaughlin 1992.
4. For a similar version see O’Connor & Wong 2005; McLaughlin 1992.
5. On  a  recent  version  of  diachronic  ontological  emergence  see  Humphreys  2016.  On  a
confrontation between diachronic and synchronic emergence see Humphreys 2008.
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